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Ruff: The Navigation Servitude: Post Kaiser-Aetna Confusion

THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE: POST
KAISER-AETNA CONFUSION
INTRODUCTION

The navigation servitude' is a judge-made doctrine. It allows Congress to impair or destroy private property interests without paying
just compensation when it exercises its power to control and regulate
navigable waters in the interest of commerce.2 Although it has a weak
theoretical foundation,3 this century-old doctrine stands as an exception to the express fifth amendment proscription on the taking of
private property for public purposes without just compensation.4 The
federal government has used the navigation servitude to destroy
bridges, piers, tunnels, rights of access and riparian land values
without compensating private owners.5 The doctrine was confined to
the removal of obstructions to navigation in the late 1800s, but has
been expanded in conjunction with the expansion of federal control
over the nation's water resources in the last 50 years.6 This expansion has been so great that several courts have applied the doctrine
to projects which did not aid navigation. 7
The United States Supreme Court attempted in 1979 to restrict
the scope of the doctrine and formulate a workable test for its ap-

1. The navigation servitude has also been referred to as a "dominant servitude," Federal Power Comm'n. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249
(1954) or a "superior navigation easement," United States v. Grand River Dam Auth.,
363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960).
2. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124 (1967).
3. Harnsberger, Eminent Domain with Water Law, 48 NEV. L. REV. 325, 436
(1961), substantially reprinted in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS S 305, at 97 (R. Clark ed.
1970). See also Note, The Navigational Servitude and the Fifth Amendment, 26 WAYNE
L. REV. 1505, 1510 (1980).
4. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 52 (1964). Professor
Sax and others have noted the ipse dixit development of the navigation servitude as
a judge-made doctrine. Note, supra note 3, at 1507.
5. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) (value of riparian
land as a hydroelectric site held not compensable); United States v. Commodore Park,
Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945) (pier); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907)
(bridge); West Chicago Street R.R. v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 506 (1906) (tunnel under river).
6. Federal systematic improvement of rivers began in 1879. Since then, federal
projects have increased in size, number and complexity with the passage of the 1936
Flood Control Act. Since 1945 many multipurpose projects have been built in nonnavigable tributaries with a stated objective of controlling navigaiion. Harnsberger,
supra note 3, at 388-89.
7. United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945) (tidal bay was
dredged to improve the runway for naval seaplanes); see infra notes 112-14 and accom-
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plication in United States v. Kaiser-Aetna.' Several lower court decisions since Kaiser-Aetna indicate that the doctrine is still confused;
some cases seem to expand the doctrine while others restrict it.'
This note examines the scope of the navigation servitude prior
to Kaiser-Aetna and thereafter. It begins by discussing the theoretical
foundations and doctrinal development prior to 1979, and arguing that
a weak theoretical foundation and mechanical application of the servitude led to an expansion in its scope which has paralleled the expansion of Congress' power to regulate navigation. Kaiser-Aetna and
several cases since 1979 will then be analyzed to show that the limitations on the scope of the navigation servitude are still unclear. An
historical explanation for the development of the doctrine, based on
the necessity of water transportation will be introduced. This note
will then advocate a balancing of the interests involved in order to
minimize the conflict between public and private concerns and to insure that the doctrine will be applied only to advance those purposes
for which it was developed.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Supreme Court opinions have either failed to analyze or have
been inconsistent in analyzing the exact theoretical foundations which
have supported and justified the navigation servitude throughout the
last century." Therefore, the basis of the doctrine remains unclear."
Three different theories have been identified by the Court at various
times; an English common law theory,'" a commerce clause power
theory 3 and a notice theory." Standing alone, none of these theories
panying text; Loving v. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982) (recreational
fishing project); see infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
8. 444 U.S. 164 (1977). "There is no denying that the strict logic of the more
recent cases limiting the government's liability to pay damages for riparian access,
if carried to its ultimate conclusion, might completely swallow up any private claim
for 'just compensation' . . .[b]ut, as Mr. Justice Holmes observed in a very different
context, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience." Id. at 178.
9. See infra notes 191-269 and accompanying text.
10. Typically, the courts assert that the commerce clause comprehends control of the navigable waters, and such control includes a dominant right to remove
obstructions. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 596 (1941).
The courts usually do not, however, explain why this dominant right to maintain or
enlarge navigability allows Congress to do so without paying just compensation. See
infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
11. Note, supra note 3, at 1507-14.
12. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
13. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R., 312 U.S. at 596 (plaintiffs land and structures
above and below high water mark were damaged when the federal government raised
the water level).
14. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 400 (1907) (Secretary
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can justify the broad scope of the doctrine in its present state."
Undoubtedly much of the present confusion in the case law is
attributable to the lack of a firm doctrinal foundation created when
the doctrine outgrew the foundation provided by English property law.
As early as 1215, the English public had the right to fish and
navigate tidal waters. ' The King held title to these public waters
and their beds in an inalienable trust for the benefit of the public.
The King also owned all other property rights in the stream but these
others were both alienable and subordinate to the public right of
fishing and navigation." The King's title to these alienable rights,
known as jus privitum, was not absolute. The jus privitum was
burdened with the concept that the King, and therefore his grantees,
could not use the property in a manner which would derogate the
public trust in navigation and fishing. Since any structures in the
navigable waters which obstructed navigation derogated the trust, the
King as trustee had the right to remove these obstructions. 8 The King
was not required to pay compensation for these seizures and removals
because the obstructions themselves constituted a use beyond the
scope of the jus privitum title. 9
When the American colonies were settled, similar rights were
passed to the colonial grantees through royal charters. The "trust"
of the navigable tidal waters vested in the original states after the
American Revolution and was ultimately transferred through the commerce clause of the Constitution to the federal government.0 In this
way the concept that navigable waters were public domain, held and
preserved by the sovereign, was carried into American jurisprudence.2'
of Army required owner of congressionally licensed bridge over navigable river to
redesign and rebuild the bridge without compensation).
15. See infra notes 25, 42, 52 and accompanying text.
16. Harnsberger, supra note 3, at 439. See also J. LEWIS, LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN, 103-07 (3rd ed. 1909).
17. J. LEwis, supra note 16, at 103-07.
18. Id.
19. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. at 16.
20. Harnsberger, supra note 3, at 444.
21. See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865) (navigable
waters of the United States are public property of the nation). One commentator argues
that much of the existing confusion in the cases could be eliminated if the servitude
were treated as an easement concept under existing property law. Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-Strugglefor a Doctrine, 48 OR. L. REV. 1 (1968).
See also Munro, The Navigation Servitude and the Severance Doctrine, 6 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 491 (1971).,
The property concept proposal seems reasonable at first glance but on close
analysis its problems become apparent. The use of an exclusive easement certainly
does not confer upon the dominant tenant proprietorship or exclude ownership of the
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The early English and American courts thought of the servitude
as a property concept. In Scranton. v. Wheeler,' for example, the
Supreme Court spoke of the riparian owners' title to the submerged
soil as being a "qualified title, a bare technical title not absolutely
at his disposal . . ." and subject to the dominant servitude for navigation in favor of the United States. 3 The English common law served
as a viable foundation so long as the servitude was used to maintain
the navigability of existing navigable streams.' However, as the scope
of the servitude expanded beyond its English antecedent, the common law proved to be an unsatisfactory theoretical foundation for the
modern American navigation servitude. 5
The common law property concept existed to preserve free
navigation on English waters,' yet as the American doctrine expanded,
the servitude was applied to further purposes other than navigation.'
servant tenant. Supreme Court decisions however, have used exclusive, proprietorship language. United States v. Grand River Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1960) ("the
United States has a superior navigation easement which precludes private ownership
of the water or its flow .. ");United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224
(1956) (Congress may appropriate the flow of a river to the exclusion of any conflicting
or competing interest). Moreover, under traditional property law, were the government to divert the stream through a canal parallel to the old bed, the easement would
not relocate itself to burden the private owners upon whose property the canal was
built. On these facts the navigation servitude was successfully asserted in Scranton
v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900). The servitude therefore does not fit within the conventional property law concept of easements.
22. 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
23. Id. at 146.
24. E. MORREALE, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 19 (R. Clarke ed. 1967), substantially reprinted from Morreale, FederalPower in Western Waters: The Navigation Power
and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Morreale] ("It seems ...as though the rule has perpetuated itself from the days when
free use of the waterways was an absolute necessity .... Today there are other, equally
important arteries of commerce. Rationalization of the continued preference of waterways on the basis of reasons that are no longer applicable is of dubious utility.")
25. The English concept of the servitude was left far behind when the definition of navigability was expanded from tidal waters to include any water that was
navigable-in-fact or could be made navigable with reasonable efforts. United States
v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). After Appalachian Power, the
scope of the servitude broadened such that it was utilized on rivers that did not actually support navigation. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499
(1945).
26. J. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 101.
27. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); Federal
Power Comm'n. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); United States
v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). The projects in these cases were built
primarily for flood control and hydroelectric purposes. However, in the enabling legislation for each project, Congress listed the aid to navigation as an incidental purpose.
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For example, the Flood Control Act of 1944 financed the Clark Hill
Dam project on the Savannah River for the primary purpose of flood
control." That project decreased navigability for flood control purposes and diametrically opposed the preservation of navigation concept. For this reason, the English common law foundation could not
have justified such an application of the servitude. The federal government nevertheless successfully invoked the navigation servitude to
escape paying compensation for the value of a hydroelectric plant site
which it flooded.'
As the scope of the American servitude broadened, the opinions
increasingly relied on the commerce clause to justify the doctrine. 0
Gibbons v. Ogden3' established federal control over navigation as a
necessary part of interstate commerce regulation.2 This federal
regulatory power over navigation is broad enough to extend to nonnavigable,' as well as navigable water' and probably extends to every
stream in the United States. 5 The power is also said to confer upon
the United States a navigation servitude and release the government
from its obligation to pay just compensation when it appropriates land
within the streambed.6
The cases have failed to satisfactorily explain how the commerce
clause regulatory power exempts the government from the "takings"
clause.3" It is often explained that the commerce clause conveys to
28. Twin City, 350 U.S. at 223-24.
29. Id. at 228.
30. Morreale, supra note 24, at 18-19.
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). It is customary to trace the origin of the navigation servitude to Gibbons. However Gibbons was not a servitude case. It simply decided
that the federal government has the ultimate responsibility to regulate interstate
navigable rivers. Moreover, designating Gibbons as the origin of the American servitude ignores the English law on which the concept was first founded. See also Morreale, supra note 24, at 5.
32. "The Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art.
I, S 8, cl.3.
33. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899)
("[Tihe jurisdiction of the federal government over interstate commerce and its natural
highways vests in that government the right to take all needed measures to preserve
the navigability of the navigable water courses of the country" even though the Rio
Grande is nonnavigable throughout the entire state of New Mexico.).
34. Id. at 703. See also Note, Determining the Parameters of the Navigation
Servitude, 34 VAND. L. REV. 461, 463 (1981).
35. Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes
and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 14 (1967).
36. United States v. Rands, 385 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913). See also infra note 38.
37. Morreale, supra note 24, at 17-18.
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the government a superior power,' against which the riparian" owner
holds merely a qualified title, subordinate to the public right of navigation.'" Therefore, when Congress appropriates the bottom of a
navigable river to aid navigation, it is not taking the private owner's
property since that property was always subject to Congress' superior
power to appropriate. 1
The commerce clause superior power rationale fails to account
for the distinction between the federal government's power to appropriate and the power to do so without paying compensation.
Nowhere in the commerce clause or in the fifth amendment does
language exist which excepts activities sanctioned by the commerce
clause from the express proscription of the "takings" clause. 2
Moreover, the commerce power has no priority over other constitutional powers, 3 yet were the government to appropriate a river bed
under the war power, property power or welfare power, it would unquestionably have to pay compensation." Since the commerce clause
neither expressly nor implicitly excepts the compensation requirement
of the "takings" clause, the commerce clause cannot provide an adequate foundation for the navigation servitude.' 5

38. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 233
(1960) ("superior power"); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25
(1956) ("The power is a dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any
competing or conflicting one."); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897) ("the
dominant right of government"); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876) ("plenary
power"). See Morreale, supra note 24, at 21.
39. A riparian owner is one who owns land on the bank of the river, or one
who owns land along, bordering upon, bounded by, fronting upon, abutting or adjacent and contiguous to and in contact with the river. Buckson v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
228 A.2d 587 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
40. Chandler-Dunbar,229 U.S. at 62-63.
41. Id.
42. Section 8. [1] The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
[2] To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
[3] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 1, 3.
43. Morreale, supra note 24, at 17.
44. See United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (Friant
Dam built under authority of general welfare clause, navigation servitude not applicable);
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 330 (Wilson Dam built under
authority of the property clause and the war power).
45. Most commentators agree that the commerce clause alone cannot justify
the present navigation servitude doctrine. Harnsberger, supra note 3, at 134; Morreale,
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Several decisions have attempted to justify the servitude on a
theory that the riparian owners had ample notice that their property
was subject to a paramount government interest." In Union Bridge
Co. v. United States, the Court ruled that the private owner erected
a bridge with the knowledge that Congress could at any time exert
its power to aid navigation." Similarly, the decisions in United States
v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co." and United States v. Rands" based on
the servitude on the theory that "riparian owners have always been
subject" to the servitude.5
The Court's assumption that riparian owners know their property
is subject to a paramount federal interest is strained. It assumes the
owner has knowledge of not only the government's power to protect
navigation, but also its power to do so without paying just compensation." The Court's assumption fails when one considers the recent expansion of the servitude.52 Since 1940,1 the scope of the navigation
servitude has expanded to include projects on waters that were
previously considered not amenable to the doctrine.' The Court cannot assume that owners obtained their property with notice of the
servitude when the servitude could not have previously applied to
that property. Consequently, the notice theory provides little justification for this unique, rather anomalous doctrine.
Another justification, expressed in one case, but probably implied in most others, is the Court's fear that Congress' power to protect and improve navigation for interstate commerce purposes would
be severely impaired if the government were required to pay com-

supra note 24, at 17; Note, supra note 34, at 464-66; Note, supra note 3, at 1511-13.
But see Munro, supra note 21, at 493.
46. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Kansas City
Life Ins., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907);
Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
47. 204 U.S. at 400.
48. 339 U.S. at 805.
49. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
50. Id. at 124.
51. Since the navigation servitude relieves the government of its duty to pay
just compensation, those charged with notice would have to know (1) that their property might be taken and (2) that it might be taken without compensation.
52. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 1508.
53. The definition of navigability and therefore the scope of the navigation
servitude was greatly enlarged in 1940 by the decision in United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). See infra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Appalachian Electric, 311 U.S. at 424-29 (the servitude would not
have applied to the New River unless the Court expanded the definition of navigability); Johnson & Austin, supra note 35, at 14.
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that resulted from an improvement to
concept was probably a viable justificaservitude in America when waterbound
the two primary modes of interstate
"subsidy" concept fails to justify the pre-

Of the several theoretical foundations offered throughout the decisions, none have singularly been able to justify the navigation servitude and its rule of no compensation. The English common law model
cannot justify the present scope of the doctrine. While the commerce
clause can justify the present scope of the servitude, it cannot justify
the rule of no-compensation. The notice theory was based on an
assumption which is now impossible to make, and the fear of crippling Congress' power to nurture commerce is likewise unwarranted
today. The lack of a firm theoretical foundation contributed to a confused expansion of the doctrine and a mechanical, territorial analysis
which produced seemingly arbitrary results.
PRE KAISER-AETNA DOCTRINE: A HISTORY OF EXPANSION

Riparian owners possess certain property rights which are con-nected with the riparian land; if these rights are taken, the owner
must be paid full compensation., 7 Generally these rights include: access to the water," use of the water for domestic purposes,59 construction of piers into the water," extension of title to accretions"' and
certain usufructuary rights 2 depending on state law. In its early
55. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 165 (1900).
56. See generally Harnsberger, supra note 3, at 145-47.
57. Harnsberger, supra note 3, at 113-14.
58. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497 (1870).
59. See Montelious v. Elseu, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 57, 161 N.E.2d 675 (1959); 93 C.J.S.
Waters § 12 (1956).
60. See United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
61. "Accretion" is the process of gradual and imperceptible addition of solid
material, called "alluvion," to the shore thus extending the shore line out by depositing
water-borne material. "Reliction" is the gradual withdrawal of water from the land.
See California ex. rel. State Lands Comm'n. v. United States, 457 U.S. 273 (1982); Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Oregon Land
Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
62. "A riparian does not own the water of a stream but owns a 'usufructuary
right,' which is the right of reasonable use of the water on his riparian land when
he needs it." Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 561 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938).
63. Generally, two doctrines exist in America regarding usufructary rights.
The riparian use doctrine is followed in the eastern states and some form of the prior
appropriation doctrine is followed in the western states. Whether the navigation servitude can extinguish private consumptive water rights is a question which has
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stages of development, the navigation servitude denied compensation
when the government appropriated structures in and denied access
to the water." The doctrine has been expanded to deny compensation when any water-related right is taken, 5 including the riparian
value of "fast land"."
At one time, the scope of the navigation servitude was as broad
as the federal government's power to regulate navigation under the
commerce clause. 7 Both the power to regulate navigation and the
navigation servitude have since been expanded considerably, but the
navigation servitude is no longer coextensive with the commerce clause
regulatory power.6 An analysis of the doctrine's expansion must begin
with a discussion of navigability.
Navigability
Prior to 1940, federal commerce clause power over navigation
extended only to those streams which met the federal test of
navigability. 9 The navigation servitude was thus limited to navigable
waters."0 As the definition of navigable waters was broadened, the
engendered considerable comment and is unfortunately outside the scope of this note.
See generally Morreale, supra note 24, at 42-49; contra Munro, The Navigation Servitude and the Severance Doctrine, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 491 (1971).
64. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (riparian right to access denied);
Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915) (removal of pier).
65. A private owner has no property rights in a navigable stream as against
the federal government. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 226-27
(1956).
66. Id. "Fast lands" are lands above the ordinary high water mark, and are
therefore not considered part of the stream bed. The government must still compensate when it floods "fast land" but it need not pay the increased value of the land
due to its being riparian.
67. "Over the years, federal interests have expanded tremendously until today the United States is engaged extensively in irrigation reclamation projects,
municipal water supply, pollution control, flood regulation recreation, and hydroelectric power generation and distribution." Harnsberger, supra note 3, at 140.
68. Prior to 1940, the ,scope of the commerce clause power to regulate navigation, and the navigation servitude were coextensive because both were limited to waters
that were naturally navigable in fact. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62-63 (1913). See generally Note, supra note 3, at 1515-16.
69. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 563 (1870) (the commerce clause
jurisdiction of the federal government extends to navigable waters, and waters which
are navigable in fact are considered navigable in law).
70. Under the English common law theory and the commerce clause theory,
the navigation servitude was limited by the then current test of navigability. The
jus publicum in England was limited to public waters, and the only public waters were
those which were tidal. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 90 (1951). See
generally Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters,
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scope of the servitude was also expanded.71 Today the federal authority
to control navigation extends to nonnavigable rivers that may affect
navigable streams. 2 Whether the servitude also extends to these nonnavigable waters is debatable; however, one certainty is that the
American version of the servitude has outgrown the English doctrine
from which it originated."
The definition of navigability that originated in English law was
limited to waters which were affected by the ebb and flow of the
tide." This definition was not suitable for a continent which had vast
inland water resources." Consequently, in 1870" the Court extended
navigability to all waters which were navigable in fact in their natural
condition." Once part of a stream satisfied the navigability definition,
federal power extended over its entire course including those parts
which were nonnavigable in fact.79 In the 1940 case of United States
v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,' the Court dropped the natural
condition requirement and included within the definition any water
that was navigable at any time in history,8 and any stream that could
5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391, 395-96 (1970). Under the commerce clause theory,
the servitude could not constitutionally be broader than the commerce clause itself,
which was limited by the navigability requirement during the nineteenth century. Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
71. Note, supra note 3, at 1514-18.
72. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899)
(the Court enjoined New Mexico from damming nonnavigable portions of the Rio Grande
river on the theory that navigable stretches in Texas would be adversely affected).
73. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
74. The English servitude is limited to tidal waters whereas its counterpart
in America may theoretically extend to all water courses. See infra notes 69-98 and
accompanying text.
75. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 455 (1851)
(overruling The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 6 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) and The
Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 12 U.S. (11 Pet.) 391 (1831)). Genessee Chief extended
admiralty jurisdiction to navigable in fact waters.
76. The doctrine of the common law as to the navigability of waters
has no application in this country. Here the ebb and flow of the tide does
not constitute the usual test, as in England, or any test at all of the
navigability of waters. There no waters navigable in fact or at least to
any considerable extent [exist] which are not subject to the tide.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
77. Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. at 455.
78. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 (this definition includes streams which
are wholly located within one state; the Grand River is wholly located in Michigan
and was deemed navigable).
79. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1878).
80. 311 U.S. 377, 409-10 (1940).
81. Id. at 406. "[Nior is it necessary that improvements should be actually
completed or even authorized." Id.
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be made navigable with reasonable expense in the future.' Any watercourse is therefore considered navigable in law if any part was, is
or can be made navigable in fact.
Cases subsequent to Appalachianhave extended federal authority
to nonnavigable waters when Congress has expressly stated that some
aspect of the project will aid navigation. 3 Today almost every river
project is considered a multi-purpose project," and Congress usually
includes in the enabling legislation language that the project will aid
navigation. 5 Since the Court defers to this legislative judgment of
purpose,88 every creek in the United States is potentially subject to
federal control under the commerce clause. 7
Expansion of the federal power to regulate navigation under the
commerce clause is important to the navigation servitude because the
servitude is usually applicable to all navigable waters.8 An expansion of the navigability definition has usually caused an expansion of
the servitude as well. 9 However, this expansion was not accomplished
without a good deal of vacillation and confusion.'
An excellent example of both the expansion of the servitude and
the confused analysis with which it has been applied is the 1960 case
of United States v. Grand River Dam Authority." The Authority
82. Id. at 407.
83. Oklahoma ex. rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
See also United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
84. See generally F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW,
RESOURCE USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 712-15 (2d ed. 1974).
85. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 657, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (concerning the Clark
Hill project in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956)).
86. This legislative judgment of purpose will not be reviewed unless it is
unreasonable. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Twin City, 350 U.S. at 224.
87. See also the charge that the majority empowered Congress to manufacture navigability. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 433
(1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
88. Under the mechanical, territorial analysis which characterized most of the
pre-Kaiser cases the servitude would apply to any navigable stream. See infra notes
138-54 and accompanying text. The Kaiser opinion dispelled any notion that the servitude applied automatically upon a finding of navigability. See infra notes 200, 201
and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Appalachian Electric, 311 U.S. at 377. The Court expanded the
definition of navigability to include streams that could be made navigable. It then
found that the New River was such a stream, applied the servitude to it, and so expanded the scope of the servitude. Id.
90. Justice Rehnquist lamented in United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 440 U.S. 169,
177 (1979), that the shifting back and forth by the Court in this area made recent
decisions bear the "sound of old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago." Id.
91. 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
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operated a power dam on the Grand River, a nonnavigable tributary
of the navigable Arkansas River. The Corps of Engineers subsequently
built a flood control dam downstream from the Authority's dam on
the Grand River, which flooded the upper dam and reservoir.12 Declining to compensate the Authority for lost power production value of
the dam, the Corps argued that power production is a function of
stream flow and, due to the navigation servitude, the public owns
the value of the flow of a nonnavigable river. 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas confused flood control jurisdiction with the
power to appropriate property without compensation.94 He bypassed
the question of whether the navigation servitude was applicable,95 and
instead found the Corps had jurisdiction to regulate under the Flood
Control Act.' The Court denied compensation relying on analysis from
several servitude decisions and applying the navigation servitude to
a nonnavigable stream under flood control jurisdiction. 7 The case
stands as authority for the proposition that the servitude may be applied to a nonnavigable stream when Congress expressly invokes its
power to regulate that stream. Grand River therefore represents a
tremendous expansion of the doctrine.
The scope of the navigation servitude was expanded through
several redefinitions of the navigability concept. The servitude is no
longer limited to tidal waters but is applicable to virtually any nonnavigable tributary upon a determination by Congress that the project will involve navigation. The often confused analysis applied by
the Court has left the scope of the doctrine unclear. This lack of clarity

92. Id. at 231.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Court stated that "when the United States appropriates the flow
of either a navigable or a nonnavigable stream pursuant to its superior power under
the commerce clause, it is exercising established prerogatives and is beholden to no
one." Id. at 233. This language is a paraphrase of the servitude analysis which constitutes the heart of United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1956)
and United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386, 391 (1945).
95. Grand River, 363 U.S. at 232. The government contended that the servitude applied to the nonnavigable water but the Court replied: "In the view we take
in this case, however, it is not necessary that we reach that contention." Id.
96. Id. at 233-34.
97. Flood control is an exercise of the commerce power; thus, its application
under flood control legislation without a declaration that the project "will aid navigation" would be constitutionally permissible, yet it would represent the broadest extension of the doctrine to date.
98. One commentator argues that Grand River is limited to cases involving
both the navigable capacity of the navigable mainstream, and an express congressional
determination to exercise its power over a nonnavigable tributary. Morreale, supra
note 24, at 8.
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probably caused the Court to develop and apply a mechanical, territorial analysis in several recurring fact situations.
Private Property in the Streambed Taken or Destroyed
The strongest case for applying the navigation servitude exists
when the private party places property in the stream and thereby
obstructs navigation. The English version of the doctrine covered just
this type of situation.99 The United States Supreme Court long ago
settled the question of compensation for the removal or destruction
of private property in the stream,' 0 but it based the servitude on
several different theories.
The Court applied the doctrine using a common law property
theory in Lewis Blue Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs."' . Lewis Co.
leased oyster beds under the Great South Bay in New York state
from a private owner. The company sought compensation for the
destruction of some of its beds when the government dredged a channel through the leasehold. The Court denied compensation reasoning
that the private owner held only a qualified title as against the government when the government improved the public right of transportation in the interests of commerce.' °2 By using the qualified title reasoning, the Court based the servitude on a property theory derived from
the English common law."'

99. J. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 103-07.
100. The issue was basically settled by 1917. Louisville Bridge Co. v. United
States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917), is the most recent "structures in the stream" case which
this research has found.
101. 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
102. Id. at 86.
103. Another example of the Court using the common law property theory is
West Chicago Street R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 506 (1906), in which the government required the railroad to remove its tunnel from under the Chicago River at its
own expense because the tunnel obstructed a government sponsored dredging operation. The Court used a property theory by reasoning that the railroad's title to the
streambed was only so good as its use was consistent with the public right to free
and unobstructed navigation. Id. at 520. The tunnel obstructed navigation because it
limited the size of the ships that could have navigated the river.
The Court then buttressed its analysis with a notice theory when it said, "the
city granted the right to construct the present tunnel under the river subject to the
condition necessarily implied by the statute of 1874 in force when the ordinance of
1888 was adopted that the tunnel should not interrupt navigation." Id. at 523. In its
next term, the Court again used the notice theory to justify the removal of a bridge
over the navigable Allegheny River in Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S.
364 (1907). For a discussion of the "notice theory" see supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
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The Court also premised the navigation servitude on commerce
clause and notice theories when it denied compensation for the taking of a pier in Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison."' The
Greenleaf company owned title to land under the Elizabeth River in
Virginia on which it built a pier. Some time later the Secretary of
War changed the federal harbor lines and included the pier within
the federal property. Responding to Greenleafs compensation claim,
the Court ruled that the owner "knew" Congress might at any time
extend the harbor boundaries pursuant to its commerce clause power
to regulate navigation.' The dissent argued that the commerce clause
could not override the fifth amendment and balked at the power given
to the Secretary of War to arbitrarily change these boundaries to
include nonnavigable water.' 6
The obstruction decisions provide examples of the confusion
which surrounds the navigation servitude. The removal of obstructions to navigation is probably the strongest case for the application
of the navigation servitude, yet the decisions relied on different
theories to justify the doctrines. In the next set of cases the Court
will continue to rely on several theories when applying the doctrine.
By denying compensation when the riparian owner's access was
destroyed, the Court expanded the scope of the doctrine beyond that
of its English counterpart.
Riparian Owner's Right to Access Denied
Under English common law, a riparian owner has a right of access to the water which cannot be obstructed when the Crown improves navigation.' In 1870 the Court expanded the scope of the
104. 237 U.S. 251, 255-58 (1915).
105. Id. at 260. In both Union Bridge and Greenleaf the Court went to great
lengths to explain that the prior case of Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312 (1893) in which the government was required to pay compensation, rested
on the theory of governmental estoppel. See infra note 284.
The Court in Greenleaf ruled that Congress acted within its commerce power
over navigation and since its superior power extends to the whole stream, and this
property was within the stream, the no-compensation rule applied. Id. at 259-63. This
logic will be used throughout the decisions and will be hereinafter referred to as the
mechanical application of the servitude. Typically, the Court will talk about Congress'
dominant power or the private owner's qualified title. Next it will define the territorial
limits of the servitude and find that the particular case fits within those limits. The
Court will then deny compensation without explaining why the application was necessary
or justified and without reiterating the purpose behind the no-compensation rule.
106. Id. at 273-74 (Lamar, J., dissenting).
107. Annot., 21 A.L.R. 206, 211 (1922). One writer argued that the right of access should have been more fully protected in America than in England because of
America's constitutional proscription against taking private property without making
compensation. 1 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 297 (1904).
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American servitude beyond that of the English doctrine in Gibson v.
United States."' There, the Court denied compensation when a federally constructed dike in the Ohio River obstructed a riparian owner's
right of river access. The Court ruled that the servitude in respect
of navigation gave the government the power to deny access'0 9 and
that no "taking" had occurred because the injury was merely an incidental consequence ' of a legitimate exercise of government power."'
While the English servitude only allowed the Crown to remove
obstructions in the waterway, the American doctrine allowed the
government to remove obstructions and devalue the riparian property by denying the owner access to the water.
An extreme example of the government denying access to the
water is found in United States v. Commodore Park."2 To improve
facilities for naval seaplanes, the government dredged a tidal bay in
West Virginia and deposited the debris at the mouth of a navigable
arm of the bay, thereby obstructing the tidal flow and creating a stagnant pond."' The Court reduced the inquiry to a mechanical, territorial
analysis by determining that the servitude precluded compensation
when, as here, the injury was caused by a navigation project and it

108. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
109. Id. at 272. The Gibson court relied on Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894),
which involved a dispute over title. Shively explained the common law concept of the
public right to navigation, and the King's power to remove obstructions to navigation
but did not explore matters of compensation. Gibson expanded Shively to read that
the servitude attaches to public water and forecloses compensation.
110. Gibson, 166 U.S. at 273. Several earlier cases including Union Bridge Co.
v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907), and Lewis Blue Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs,
229 U.S. 82 (1913), relied on the fact that the "taking" was only an incidental consequence of a lawfully exercised power. Modern courts tend to discredit the incidental
consequence theory and award compensation for such injuries. See United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (noise from low altitude military aircraft flyovers which
disturbed a commercial chicken farm was held a compensable "taking").
111. Three years later in Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900), the Court
used the property law analysis to deny compensation when the government precluded
Scranton's access to the St. Mary River. Scranton was denied access to the water
when the government built a pier which was wholly within the water and which ran
parallel to the stream flow. The pier extended past Scranton's property on both sides
and effectively cut off his access to the river. Id. at 142-44. The Court agreed that
the injury was not merely incidental, and cited Gibson concluding that compensation
could be denied because Scranton's title was qualified. Justice Harlan justified his
position by expressing fear that the government's power to improve navigation would
be crippled if it were required to pay compensation for every injury arising out of
the exercise therefrom. Id. at 165. Scranton is thus one of the few cases in which
the Court has attempted to express the economic policies behind the navigation
servitude.
112. 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
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occurred in the stream."' It buttressed the analysis by observing that
the United States had commerce clause power to destroy navigation
in one place in order to foster it in another. " 5 The analysis was strained because the project was not actually intended to aid navigation. "6
Therefore, Commodore Park represents a broad expansion of the
navigation servitude.
The scope of the American servitude exceeded the English version when riparian owners were denied access to the water and the
government avoided paying compensation. The Court allowed the
government to avoid paying compensation when it decreased the value
of riparian property by undertaking a navigation project in the stream.
The Court applied the servitude in a mechanical manner, denying compensation for any injury when the source of the injury was a navigation project and the injury occurred in the stream. This mechanical
application reached its epitome when navigability itself was destroyed
in order to advance a project only remotely related to navigation.
The mechanical analysis will be readily apparent in the cases which
define the limits of the servitude. The Court will automatically deny
compensation on a showing that the injury is within the territorial
limits of the servitude.
Territorial Limits: Banks and Tributaries
When analyzing servitude cases the Court will typically talk
about Congress' dominant power or the owner's qualified title. Then
it will define the territorial limits of the servitude and determine
whether the particular injury complained of fits within those limits.
If the case fits the territorial limitations, the Court will then deny
compensation without explaining why the application was necessary
or justified and without reiterating the purpose behind the no113. Id. at 389-90.
114. Id. at 390-93. Commodore Park was not the first case in which the Court
used this type of analysis. The Court in Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison,
237 U.S. 251 (1915), ruled that Congress had acted within its commerce power over
navigation and since its superior power extended to the whole stream, and the particular property was within the stream, the no-compensation rule applied. Id. at 259-63.
The Court uses similar logic throughout the decisions. Typically, the Court will talk
about Congress' dominant power or the private owner's qualified title. Next it will
define the territorial limits of the servitude and find that the particular case fits within
those limits. The Court will then deny compensation without explaining why the application was necessary or justified and without reiterating the purpose behind the
no-compensation rule.

115.
116.
Id. at 391.

Commodore Park, 324 U.S. at 393.
The bay was dredged so it could serve as a runway for naval seaplanes.
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compensation rule."' Central to this analysis is the Court's definition
of the doctrine's territorial limits. Regarding the navigable mainstream,
the servitude was historically limited to the high water mark. Regarding tributaries, however, the more recently adopted limits exemplify
the inequities that can occur with such a mechanical analysis.
The 1893 decision in Shively v. Bowlby"8 established that in the
navigable mainstream, navigation servitude extends to all property
below the ordinary high water mark." 9 The Court later determined
that the doctrine includes property which does not obstruct navigation and it applies even when the government artificially raises and
maintains the water at or above the ordinary high water level' of
the navigable mainstream.'2 ' A later group of cases then determined
United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945); United
117. See, e.g.,
States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); Greenleaf Johnson Lumber
Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915); Lewis Blue Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229
U.S. 82 (1913).
118. 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
119. Ordinary high water has been defined in various ways such as the average
height of all high waters at a given location over a span of 18.6 years, United States
v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 20 (5th Cir. 1970); as the line where the water stands sufficiently long to destroy vegetation below it, Kelley's Creek and Northwestern R.R. v. United
States, 100 Ct. Cl. 396, 406 (1943); as the line below which the soil is so usually
covered by water that it is wrested from vegetation and its value for agricultural
purposes is destroyed, Harrison v. Fjie, 148 F. 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1906); as the line
below which the waters have so visibly asserted their dominion that terrestrial plant
life ceases to grow and, therefore, the value of agricultural purposes is destroyed,
Borough of Ford City v. United States, 345 F.2d 645, 548 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 902 (1965), or as the line below which the soil is kept practically bare of vegetation
by the wash of the waters of the river from year to year in their onward course,
Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606, 632 (1923).
120. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 599 (1941).
The railroad owned an embankment on the west bank of the Mississippi River which
was protected up to the high water mark by a layer of stone. Additionally the railroad
had placed telegraph poles above and below the high water line. The government raised
the water level above the high water line, flooding the poles and the embankment.
The Court denied compensation for all damages inflicted below the high water line
and remanded the case to determine which property was below that line. The Court
thereby implicitly recognized that the government must pay compensation for those
lands inundated above the ordinary high water line. Id. Neither the telephone poles
nor the embankment obstructed navigation. Id. at 595, 599.
121. Id. at 598. Chicago, M., St. P. expressly overruled United States v. Lynah,
188 U.S. 445 (1903), which allowed recovery for property located between low and
high water marks on a navigable river. It also expressly confined United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) to its facts. See infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
In 1972 the Court of Claims extended the Chicago, M., St. P. doctrine to include within
the servitude property which was at all time "fast lands" but which was washed away
as a result of federal harbor improvements. Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975
(Ct. Cl. 1972).
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to which tributary the navigation servitude extends when the governthe water level of several streams by damming one
ment raises
22
stream.
The earliest tributary case limited the servitude to rivers and
tributaries that were navigable and whose water was at its natural
level." Thus, in United States v. Cress, compensation was allowed when
a federal dam on the navigable Kentucky River raised the water level
of a nonnavigable1 24tributary and destroyed the power generating
capacity of a mill.
Cress was limited by Chicago M. St. P. 125 twenty years later when
the Court eliminated any distinction between the natural and artificial
level of a stream. 2 ' Together Cress and Chicago M. St. P. represent
that the servitude applies to the navigable mainstream up to the high
water mark but is not applicable to the nonnavigable tributary even
though it may have been made navigable when the water was raised. If the government were to raise the level to the high water
mark and damage two properties below high water, one riparian to
the mainstream and one riparian to the nonnavigable tributary, only
the owner riparian to the tributary would be entitled to compensation.
This hypothetical was presented to the Court in United States
v. Willow River Power Co.1 28 The power company owned a hydroelectric plant at the confluence of the navigable St. Croix and the nonnavigable Willow Rivers. It built a power dam on the Willow River,
the tail race" of which emptied directly into the St. Croix. When
the government raised the St. Croix three feet, it decreased the
powerhead"30 drop at the dam and thereby decreased its power

122. The river improvement project in this line of cases is usually situated
in a navigable river. Congress does not expressly exert the navigation power over
the nonnavigable tributaries to the mainstream as it did in United States v. Grand
River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960). See supra notes 91-98.
123. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
124. Id. at 318. Cress decided two fact situations. In the second, a federal dam
on the navigable Cumberland river flooded a fording place. The Court awarded compensation because the doctrine did not, at that time, apply to a nonnavigable river. Id.
125. 312 U.S. 592 (1941). See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
126. Chicago, M., St. P. held that the government could, with impunity, raise
and maintain the navigable stream at ordinary high water level. Id. at 399.
127. Morreale, supra note 24, at 32.
128. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
129. "Tailrace" is the lower mill race; the channel into which the water from
a waterwheel or turbine is discharged. WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L. DICTIONARY 1569 (2d ed.

1939).
130. A "powerhead" or "waterhead" is a dammed-up body of water for supplying a garden, mill, etc. See WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2884 (2d ed. 1939). When
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generating capacity.' The only factual difference between Willow
River and Cress is that the tail race in Willow River emptied directly
into navigable waters, whereas the tail race in Cress emptied into
nonnavigable waters.
The majority denied compensation arguing that since the tail race
emptied directly into the navigable St. Croix, any injury occurred in
the navigable mainstream.' 2 The dissent argued that the injury occurred on a nonnavigable tributary and then questioned the wisdom
of a distinction which would have required compensation if the dam
had been located a few hundred feet further up the nonnavigable
river.'"
Willow River exemplifies how the Court uses the mechanical
analysis to apply the navigation servitude based solely on the fortuitous circumstance of location. Under this mechanical formula one
riparian owner may receive no compensation for damage caused by
an increase in the water level while conceivably his neighbor who
happened to be riparian to a tributary would. This analysis fosters
inequitable decisions because it requires the Court to deny compensation without examining the competing policy considerations underlying the servitude and the "takings" clause. This analysis does not require the Court to determine whether the doctrine 'isnecessary or
justified in our present society. The Court's final expansion of the
servitude's territorial limits came when it denied compensation for
the riparian value of flooded "fast land."
Valuation of "Fast Lands"
Although the flooding of "fast lands"'34 was held a compensable
taking as early as 1871,' s5 in United States v. Twin City Power Co.
the difference between the levels of the water above and below the dam is decreased,
the power generating capacity of the impounded body of water is lessened.
131. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 500-01 (1945).
132. Id. at 504.
133. Id. at 514-15 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The territorial limits of the navigation servitude were again explained in United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
339 U.S. 799 (1950), as including any property within the banks of a navigable stream
up to the ordinary high water mark. The 5-4 majority awarded compensation to an
owner of land riparian to a nonnavigable tributary which was raised when the Corps
of Engineers dammed the Mississippi River. The rise in water level elevated the water
table and prevented the property from draining into the stream through its intricate
system of ditches and pipes. Willow River was distinguished on the ground that the
loss occurred in the nonnavigable tributary. Id. at 807. Thus, the Court affirmed Cress
and its rule for determining compensation based on the arbitrary circumstance of
location.
134. See supra note 66.
135. Pompelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
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the Court denied compensation for riparian values of flooded "fast
land."" Twin City Power Company owned "fast land" which had value
as a hydroelectric site and which the government intended to flood.' 37
The issue was whether the value of the power company's land as a
hydroelectric site on the navigable Savannah River should have been
included in the compensation computation." In denying compensation,
the Court reasoned that private ownership of the running water in
a great navigable stream is inconceivable due to the navigation servitude." 9 The power company, therefore, could not claim value for the
running water, because it held no property right as against the federal
government. Since a hydroelectric plant receives all of its value from
the unfettered flow of the running water, the power company could
not claim the value of the site as a hydroelectric plant site. 40
Four dissenters argued that by failing to compensate for the best
use of the land, the majority had extended the navigation servitude
beyond the streambed and applied it to "fast lands.'' In a sense they
were right; the servitude's boundary was still the bed of the stream,
but any value which the land derives from the circumstance of being
riparian was noncompensable. Even though Twin City may not have
expanded the doctrine's territorial limits, the Court's use of the
mechanical analysis certainly did expand the list of injuries which are
noncompensable under the navigation servitude.'

136. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
137. The power company had been granted a federal power license which expired before the company began construction. Id. at 231-32.
138. Id.
139. This reasoning was taken directly from United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 66-67 (1913) (compensation was denied for the present
value of future hydroelectric power to have been generated by a facility located within
the banks of the stream). However, the Chandler court awarded compensation for the
special location and adaptability of the land for a canal and set of locks. Id. The locks
in Chandler and the facility in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222
(1956), both depended on water for their value, but in Twin City the property was
not in the bed of the stream. Id. at 224. Chandler is therefore tenuous authority for
the proposition that the value of "fast land" is solely a function of stream flow which
is owned by the government, and therefore not subject to compensation.
140. Twin City, 350 U.S. at 222.
141. Id. at 245 (Burton, J., with Frankfurter, Minton, and Harlan, J.J., dissenting.)
142. Some commentators believed that the Court retreated from its Twin City
decision in United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961), by
straining to find an alternative compensable value in an easement held by the power
company to flood certain lands which was "taken" when the government flooded those
lands. See, e.g., Bartke, supra note 21, at 18-21.
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The Court reaffirmed Twin City in the 1967 case of United States
a
by not allowing for the valuation of "fast land" as a port
v. Rands""
site on the Columbia River. After analogizing to the riparian access
cases,"' the Court cited Twin City as controlling and allowed compensation only for the land's value for sand, gravel and agricultural
purposes." 5
In response to the considerable criticism evoked by Rands, Congress effectively overruled both it and Twin City with section 111
of the Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Act of 1970.4' Section
111 was effectively applied to compensate for the riparian value of
lake front property which was "taken" for a wilderness park."7 Accordingly, it appears that the Twin City expansion of the navigation servitude has been effectively halted. 4 '
Paralleling the expansion of federal control over the nation's
water resources, the navigation servitude has expanded from a doctrine limited to tidal waters to a rule applicable to all navigable, and
some nonnavigable rivers. 49 The early obstruction cases applied the
servitude using a property concept analysis, commerce clause power

143. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
144. "[Jiust as the navigational privilege permits the government to reduce
the value of riparian lands by denying the riparian owner access to the stream without
compensation for his loss . . . it also permits the Government to disregard the value
arising from this same fact of riparian location in compensating the owner when fast
lands are appropriated." Id. at 123-24 (quoting Virginia Electric, 365 U.S. at 629).
145. Rands, 389 U.S. at 124-25.
146. Section 111, which has been codified at 33 U.S.C. S 595(a) provides:
In all cases where real property shall be taken by the United States for
the public use in connection with any improvement of rivers, harbors,
canals, or waterways of the United States, and all condemnation proceedings by the United States to acquire lands or easements for such
improvements, the compensation to be paid for real property taken by the
United States above the normal high water mark of navigable waters of the
United States shall be the fair market value of such real property based
upon all the uses to which such real property may reasonably be put, including its highest and best use, any of which uses may be dependent
upon access to or utilization of such navigable waters.
33 U.S.C. S 595(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
147. United States v. 967.905 Acres in Minnesota, 447 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971).
148. The Twin City analysis has since appeared in a context unrelated to water.
The doctrine was applied in United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973), to deny compensation for the increased value of a cattle ranch due to its contiguity to government property over which the rancher held a grazing license. The Twin City doctrine
is by no means dead.
149. See supra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
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analysis, and a notice theory. These cases provide the foundation for
confusion in the later decisions through the Court's application of the
servitude without an explanation as to why it was necessary or
justified.',
The scope of the servitude exceeded that of the English model
when compensation was denied to riparians whose access to the stream
had been blocked by a federal improvement to navigation. The original
concept was completely distorted when compensation was denied for
the loss of access occasioned by the destruction of a navigable
stream. 51
The physical limitations of the servitude have expanded from
the natural level of the stream limitation to include all injury occurring
below the ordinary high water mark even if the stream is artificially
maintained at that level. A mechanical formula has been worked out
by which compensation may depend on location alone."'2 Finally, the
no-compensation rule has been expanded past the banks of the stream
to include the riparian value of "fast land." So much criticism was
leveled at this last expansion that Congress passed legislation designed
to override Rands and Twin City."
Against this backdrop of continued, confused expansion of the
servitude between 1920 and 1979, and the criticism of that expansion, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Kaiser-Aetna."u
THE KAISER DECISION

The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Kaiser-Aetna
spawned considerable literary comment. 55 Most commentators applauded the decision as significantly limiting the scope of the servitude;
some voiced concern that the opinion merely injected one more ele-

150. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 117-33.
153. See supra notes 134-48.
154. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
155. Brady, The Navigation Easement and Unjust Compensation, 15 J. MAR. 357
(1982); Want, The Taking Defense to Wetlands Regulation, 14 ENVT'L L. REP. 10169
(1984); Note, Taking Without Just Compensation, 94 HARV. L. REV. 205 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Takings); Note, Navigable Water Not Always Subject to Free Public
Access, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 161 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Public Access]; Note,
Freedom from the Navigation Servitude Through Private Investment, 59 NEB. L. REV.
1073 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Freedom]; Note, supra note 34, at 461; Recent Decision, Should Public Works Projects Anchor the Navigation Servitude: Kaiser-Aetna v.
United States, 41 MD. L. REV. 156 (1981).
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ment into an already confused doctrine; and some construed the opinion narrowly, predicting that it would be limited to its facts." The
remainder of this note analyzes the Kaiser-Aetna decision and its application in the last five years, arguing that the scope of the navigation servitude is still uncertain and that the significance of KaiserAetna remains unclear.
The subject of the Kaiser-Aetna dispute, Kuapa Pond, was a twofoot deep, nonnavigable, in fact, fish pond in Hawaii.'57 Prior to its
improvement, it was separated from a navigable bay by a barrier
beach which contained two openings to the bay.'58 Through these two
openings, the pond was subject to the influx of the high tide which
cleansed the pond and made it suitable to raise fish.'59 In the late
1960s Kaiser-Aetna dredged and improved the pond into a private,
navigable marina, ' after which the Army Corps of Engineers sought
an injunction to compel public access to the marina. The injunction
was denied at the trial level, but was granted by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.' 6 ' The Supreme Court then reversed the Ninth Circuit and specifically held that the navigation servitude does not
automatically apply to a previously nonnavigable pond rendered
navigable through private expenditure. Even though the pond is subject to regulation under the navigation power of the commerce clause,
a balancing test must be employed to determine the applicability of
the servitude.' 2

156. See supra note 155.
157. Kuapa Pond covered 523 acres and extended approximately 2 miles inland from Mounahua Bay and the Pacific Ocean on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. United
States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 46 (D.C. Haw. 1976), rev'd, 584 F.2d 378 (9th
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
158. Id.
159. The district court described the tidal pond as follows:
The fishpond's managers placed removable sluice gates in the stone walls
across these openings. During high tide, water from the bay and ocean
entered the pond through the gates. During low tide, the current flow
reversed toward the ocean.
The Hawaiians utilized the tidal action in the pond to raise and
catch fish, primarily mullet. During ebb tides, the sluice gates allowed
water but not large fish to escape, thus "flushing" and enriching the pond
while preserving the crop. Water depths in the pond varied up to 2 feet
at high tide. Large areas of land at the inland end were completely exposed at low tide. The fishermen harvested the pond with the aid of
shallow-draft canoes or boats, but the barrier beach and stone walls
prevented boat travel directly therefrom to the open bay. Id.
160. Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 168.
161. Id. at 170.
162. Id. at 180.
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Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, sidestepped the
question of whether the pond was legally navigable because prior to
the improvement it had been subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.
He impliedly ruled that navigability for servitude purposes means
waters that are navigable in fact regardless of whether they are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.'63 Having disposed of the government's threshold argument,'" Rehnquist positioned himself to address
the issue of whether a nonnavigable pond, made navigable by a private
effort, is automatically subject to the navigation servitude.'65
Rehnquist made the most important ruling in the case in holding
that the navigation servitude does not automatically apply when Congress regulates navigation under the commerce clause. Even though
the Corps of Engineers had the power to regulate Kuapa Pond under
the Rivers and Harbors Act, that the servitude automatically applied
did not follow.'" By so ruling, the Rehnquist majority was free from
the mechanical application of the servitude which had characterized
many of the decisions and was thereby able to balance the policies
and equities of the case.'
The servitude, explained Rehnquist, "exists by nature of the commerce clause in navigable streams [and] gives rise to an authority
in the government to assure that such streams retain their capacity
to serve as continuous highways for the purpose of navigation in in163. As the dissent points out, Rehnquist skipped the issue of the pond's
navigability in its natural state. The opinion clearly states that the pond was subject
to the ebb and flow of the high tide and would thus be navigable under the ebb and
flow test which had been affirmed as recently as 1974 in United States v. Stoeco Homes,
498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974). Since Rehnquist had to get past navigability in the natural
state before he could deal with the artificial navigability produced by private effort,
the opinion must be read as impliedly rejecting the ebb and flow test for application
of the servitude.
164. Brief for Respondent, United States at 20, Kaiser-Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
165. Rehnquist had at this point reduced the Kaiser-Aetna issue to the same
one as in the companion case of Vaughn v. Vermillion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979), namely, whether a nonnavigable water made navigable by private effort, is subject to the
no-compensation rule of the navigation servitude when the waterway is "taken" by
the government.
166. "[Tjhis Court has never held that the navigational servitude [which] creates
a blanket exception to the "takings" clause [applies] whenever Congress exercises its
commerce clause authority to promote navigation." Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 173.
167. The government and the dissent made the traditional argument that the
servitude attaches automatically upon a finding of navigability. Id. at 184-87. Since Rehnquist rejected this contention, he was faced with deciding under what circumstances
the doctrine should apply. At this point he could have either formulated a new test
or applied a balance. He chose the latter. Id. at 177-81.
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terstate commerce."' 68 He then examined Kuapa Pond and found that
due to its incapability of being used as a continuous highway for the
purpose of navigation in interstate commerce, it was not the sort of
great navigable stream which has been recognized as being incapable
of private ownership.' 9 In addition, he ruled that Kaiser-Aetna's expenditures in the face of government silence led to the fruition of
a number of "investment backed expectancies."1 7 0 Thus, the balance
resulted in favor of Kaiser-Aetna and the servitude did not apply.
Rehnquist then reiterated that since the pond was subject to commerce clause jurisdiction, the Corps could require it to be opened to
to invoke the
the public; however, to do so the Corps would have
7
eminent domain power and pay just compensation.'1
Justice Blackmun's dissent argued that the pond was navigable
prior to its improvement under the ebb and flow test, and certainly
thereafter under the Appalachian test.' 7' He then argued that the servitude extended to the limits of interstate commerce by water and
thus extended to Kuapa Pond whether or not it was considered
navigable prior to its improvement.' Finally, he charged that the majority decision would enable private developers to claim that their
improvements to a waterway had transformed that highway for interstate commerce into private property and thereby had allowed them
to restrict access.17
Kaiser-Aetna is unique in two respects. First, it does not involve
an inland stream as do most servitude cases, but rather a lagoon contiguous to the Pacific Ocean.' 5 An ocean lacks the physical restrictions of a river and therefore should not be subject to the same degree
of regulation required to insure the free flow of commerce.' 6 Second,

168. Id. at 178.
169. Id. at 179-80.
170. Id. at 180.
171. Id. at 181.
172. Id . at 182-84 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 184-87.
174. Id. at 192. The dissent and several commentators argued that the majority used the status of Kuapa pond under state law, which was something similar to
"fast lands," to defeat the servitude. The majority was indeed unclear as to the importance of Hawaiian property law. However, that law cannot be considered a factor.
In Vaughn v. Vermillian Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979), Kaiser-Aetna's sister case which
was decided upon the controlling principles in Kaiser-Aetna, no such private property
rights existed to transform navigable water into "fast land." Id. at 208.
175. See supra notes 157, 159.
176. It would be much harder to obstruct navigation in the ocean than it would
be in a river. The government therefore has a greater interest when the servitude
is asserted over a river site than when it is asserted over an ocean site.
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the government action involved in Kaiser-Aetna was initiated solely
by the Corps of Engineers. It was neither initiated by Congress' 7 nor
executed under congressional authority pursuant to a specific improvement project, as have been most other recent servitude cases.' If
Congress had initiated the action, and therefore been more directly
involved in the action, Rehnquist might have had difficulty convincing a majority of the Court that the navigation servitude did not
automatically apply. These factual distinctions have prevented KaiserAetna from being the water shed case which several commentators
predicted it would be.'79
Kaiser-Aetna's importance lies in the territorial and theoretical
limitations it placed on the navigation servitude. The Court rejected
the notion that nonnavigable in fact tidal waters are subject to the
servitude.'" Consequently, the United States may not be able to raise
the navigation servitude as a defense to inverse condemnation claims
arising from regulation under the Wetlands and Clean Water Acts."'
Moreover, the servitude may not apply to tidal waters close to the
shore that are nonnavigable due to the surf. Thus, private owners
may now have a defense to the denial of dredge and fill permits and .
other federal regulation when the property is not navigable in fact.'82
The Kaiser-Aetna decision flatly rejected any contention that the
servitude is co-extensive with the commerce clause power over naviga"
tion. 83
' Justice Rehnquist cautioned against the continued expansion
of the doctrine arguing that under the strict logic of the earlier cases,
the servitude could conceivably be applied to any exercise of commerce clause power." The most profound impact, however, involves

177. The action was initiated by the Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and
Harbors Act, 22 U.S.C. S 403 (1899) which is "blanket" legislation giving the Corps
power to keep navigable waters free of obstructions. United States v. Kaiser-Aetna,
444 U.S. 164, 169 (1979).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967) (John Day Lock and
Dam project); United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961)
(Dam River project); United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960)
(Ft. Gibson project).
179. See Recent Decision, supra note 155, at 1092.
180. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
181. See Want, supra note 155, at 10171. See also infra notes 226-33 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
183. United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 173 (1979).
184. Rehnquist said:
There is no denying that the strict logic of the more recent cases
limiting the Government's liability to pay damages for riparian access,
if carried to its ultimate conclusion, might completely swallow up any
private claim for "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment even
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the majority's disregard of the absolute, mechanical analysis that had
characterized the servitude decisions for many years." 5 Instead, the
Court used a balancing test to decide whether the doctrine was applicable, weighing the government's interest in avoiding payment of
compensation, against the private economic and estoppel interests.'
After the Court found that the servitude did not apply, it used a traditional eminent domain analysis to determine whether the regulation
was sufficient to constitute a compensable taking."7
Critics justifiably point out that while the Court narrowed the
definition of navigability and discredited the mechanical application
of the doctrine, Kaiser-Aetna left the doctrine in a state of confusion."
The Court failed to expressly overrule prior precedent; it also failed
to explain the importance of Kaiser's investment, or of the prior status
of Kuapa Pond under Hawaiian law, or the significance of the Corps'
prior consent to dredge, or the value of the "expectancies" created
in Kaiser. Thus, the lower courts are now required to strike a balance
without guidance as to the relative values of the factors.' 8
Other commentators have argued that since the Kaiser-Aetna
facts are unique to previous servitude decisions, and since the majority failed to give clear direction for future application of the doctrine, the decision may not have precedential value in the river context
and therefore may be limited to its facts.'9 An examination of the
post Kaiser-Aetna cases will demonstrate that the prophesy of these
latter critics has been borne out. The lower courts are not using the
balancing analysis in river cases and the future scope of the navigation servitude is still unclear.
POST KAISER DOCTRINE

In five years since the Kaiser-Aetna decision, the lower courts
have inconsistently applied the navigation servitude. The decisions
in a situation as different from the riparian condemnation cases as this one.
Id. at 177.
185. See supra notes 166, 167 and accompanying text.
186. Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-81.
187. The servitude is an exception to the "takings" clause. If the servitude
does not apply, the next step is the conventional "taking" analysis under Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Court in Kaiser-Aetna concluded that the government's attempt to create a public right of access was sufficient
to amount to a "taking." Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179.
188. Takings, supra note 155, at 213-14.
189. Id. This commentator argues that the ad hoc analysis begun by the Court
will make outcomes unpredictable and property interests insecure. He calls for a clear
rule that the "takings" clause applies to waters made navigable by private parties.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 3
472

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.20

involving the doctrine as a defense to Clean Water Act (C.W.A.) and
Rivers and Harbors Act (R.H.A.) regulation have adhered to the principles advanced in Kaiser-Aetna,9 ' while decisions involving the more
conventional river settings have mechanically applied the servitude
92
with little mention of Kaiser-Aetna.'
Some courts seem willing to
restrict the scope of the doctrine, while at least one other court has
applied the servitude to further a public recreation project.'93 The
navigation servitude is as confused as ever and is therefore unpredictable."'
The Court of Claims rejected an attempt to use the navigation
servitude as a defense to regulation under the R.H.A. in Laney v.
United States.'95 Laney claimed a regulatory "taking" when the Corps
refused to issue him the required permit to build a pier to access
his small island in the Atlantic Ocean.' The Corps argued that the
servitude precludes any compensation award when the government
denies a riparian's right of access. Citing Kaiser-Aetna, the court ruled that the servitude is intended to promote navigation, and is not
to be used as a tool to regulate the uses to which an island may be
put by denying the only feasible method of access.' 97 It then
distinguished the earlier access denial decisions' because in those
cases the government was improving navigation whereas in Laney
the Corps was regulating the island." The court declined to
automatically apply the doctrine to a government action involving
navigable waters and instead inquired whether the proposed application would be consistent with the doctrine's purpose.' Since the Corps'

190. Freedom, supra note 155, at 1092.
191. The Clean Water Act (formerly the Federal Water Pollution Control Act)
is codified at 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1376 (1982). The Rivers and Harbors Act comprises
virtually all of title 33. 33 U.S.C. S 1-1251 (1982). See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 206-52 and accompanying text.
193. Loving v. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982), affd, 745 F.2d
861 (4th Cir. 1984).
194. Unpredictability in a doctrine is undesirable for attorneys who must counsel
clients about the legal consequences of various decisions. Unpredictability in the navigation servitude doctrine can also cause insurance, mortgage, and market valuation problems for riparian owners.
195. 661 F.2d 145 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
196. Id. at 145-47. It appears that the Corps denied the required permit because
the Corps wanted the island kept in its pristine state.
197. Id. at 149.
198. The decisions in which the government successfully denied a riparian
owner's right of access to the water are discussed supra in the text accompanying
notes 107-16.
199. Laney, 661 F.2d at 147-49.
200. Id.
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regulation was unrelated to navigation, the court avoided expanding
the doctrine by declining to apply the servitude.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia also followed Kaiser-Aetna and avoided expanding the ser0
vitude in 1902 Atlantic Limited v. Hudson."
' The property owner had
claimed a "taking" when the Corps refused to issue it a permit to
fill a man-made borrow pit which was nonnavigable in fact but subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. 2 Responding to the government's
navigation servitude defense, the court cited Kaiser-Aetna and ruled
that the mere ebb and flow of the tide is an insufficient basis to invoke the navigation servitude."' 3 It then applied the traditional "takings" analysis and awarded compensation. ' Through 1985, the lower
courts have not expanded the navigation servitude by applying it as
a defense against "taking" claims under C.W.A. and R.H.A. regulation. 0 '

201. 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983).
202. The "borrow pit" consisted of 22 acres of sand and mudflat bottom area
and of less than 3/4 acres of wetlands. It was completely contained within man-made
embankments and was subjected to inundation by tidal flow from a creek. Id. at 1384.
203. Id. at 1405.
204. Id.
205. In two other cases, the Court of Claims sidestepped the government's
assertion that the navigation servitude was a defense to the developer's claim that
the Corps' denial of dredge and fill permits amounted to a taking. In both Deltona
Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), and Jentgen v. United States,
657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), the developers owned properties which were subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide and which were thus subject to federal jurisdiction. The
properties were not navigable in fact, so when the Corps of Engineers denied the
required dredge and fill permits, the developers claimed that the denial constituted
a "taking." The Court apparently viewed the imposition of the servitude as a close
question even though Kaiser-Aetna disapproved of the ebb and flow test for servitude
purposes. The Court expressly declined to address the issue and denied compensation
in both cases by holding that the mere frustration of reasonable investment-backed
expectancies did not constitute a "taking." Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1194; Jentgen, 657 F.2d
at 1214. See also Want, supra note 155, at 10172.
The District Court of Idaho also exhibited an unwillingness to automatically
apply the doctrine in Swanson v. United States, 600 F.Supp. 802 (D. Idaho 1985). The
court ruled that the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction extended to the entire surface area
of a lake which the Corps had enlarged. In a dictum, the court noted that it had not
decided whether the newly flooded areas were subject to a public right of access. It said:
A careful reading of the Kaiser opinion reveals that though a body of
water is a navigable water of the United States subject to Congress'
regulatory authority under the commerce clause, it does not necessarily
follow that the body of water in question is also subject to the public
right of access. In so holding, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals' determination that federal regulatory authority over navigable
waters and the right of public access could not consistently be separated
(citations omitted).
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Though the courts have not extended the servitude to relieve
the government of its obligation to compensate owners for certain
regulatory takings, the courts are using the mechanical analysis in
traditional types of servitude cases. These lower courts seem unwilling to apply the Kaiser-Aetna balancing approach and seem uncertain
as to whether the doctrine should be expanded to other nontraditional
areas.
An excellent example of a court's reliance on pre-Kaiser-Aetna
analysis is United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Valdez."' At
issue was a state-owned ferry terminal in Valdez Harbor on which
the government wished to place a Coast Guard station. °7 During the
condemnation proceedings, the state claimed compensation for the
dock. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that Congress had
invoked the navigation power by stating in the appropriation legislation that the project was to improve and protect navigation. 08 The
court then cited Kaiser-Aetna and stated that the navigation servitude
does not automatically apply whenever the navigation power is invoked."' Instead of balancing the equities involved, the court merely
distinguished the facts from Kaiser-Aetna on the ground that no
private investment was present. The court applied the territorial
analysis of Chicago, M., St. P. and thus denied compensation." '
The result of the Valdez decision was correct, however, the
reasoning was wrong. Kaiser-Aetna teaches that the court should
determine whether the particular watercourse serves as a "continuous
highway for the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce" and
then balance that interest against the equities that favor the private
owner."' The Ninth Circuit merely distinguished Kaiser-Aetna and applied Chicago, M., St. P.21 The fault with this analysis is that Chicago,

Id. at 809. Thus the court declined to automatically apply the servitude solely on a
finding of navigability.
206. 666 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1982).
207. The existing ferry terminal facility consisted of the wooden ramps used
as a dock and twelve clusters of closely driven pilings used as a fender or mooring
guide. This terminal was built by the Corps of Engineers with federal funds though
it was owned by the State of Alaska. Id. at 1238.
208. The court did not dispute Congress' stated purpose. "We may not second
guess Congress' decision that the action will aid navigation." Id. at 1239.
209. Id. at 1239-40.
210. Id. at 1240.
211. United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 177-80 (1979). See also supra
notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
212. The court applied pre-Kaiser precedent stating:
We are persuaded that the instant case if governed by the line of cases
holding that private improvements connected to fastlands but located in
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M., St. P., Rands, Commodore Park and similar decisions made no inquiry whether the servitude was necessary for that particular water
course.213 Once jurisdiction was found, these earlier cases only asked
whether the property was below the high water line and whether
the stream was navigable. The Court simply applied the servitude
whenever these questions were answered affirmatively.214 Kaiser-Aetna
rejected such a mechanical approach and instead mandated a balancing approach.2 Therefore, the court should not have employed Chicago,
M., St. P. to determine the applicability of the servitude to this water
course. The prior decisions are helpful to determine the territorial
limits of the servitude once it is applied, but not to determine its
applicability in the first instance.
The Valdez decision would have probably been the same if a
balance analysis had been used. For example, the watercourse in question was a boat harbor" 6 where some interstate commerce was likely
to have been carried on. The government interest in not paying compensation to protect that flow of commerce is therefore moderately
strong."7 The private interest is conversely weak because although
the state owned the dock, it was built with federal funds. 16 Accordingly, the servitude should apply.
The Claims Court likewise abandoned the balance approach in
Miller v. United States. 19 Miller owned land riparian to the Arkansas
navigable waters may be altered or removed by the Government to improve navigation without compensating the owner. See, e.g., United States
v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S.
386 (1945); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592
(1941); Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915);
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
Valdez, 666 F.2d at 1240.
213. Since the servitude applied to all navigable streams, a finding of navigability
precluded inquiry into the necessity of applying the servitude to each particular stream.
See United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 109-54.
215. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
216. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Valdez, 666 F.2d 1236, 1238
(9th Cir. 1982).
217. The stimulation of water based transportation in interstate commerce is
the end for which the navigation servitude doctrine is but a means. Therefore when
a given watercourse is more important, in terms of its impact on navigation in interstate commerce than another watercourse, the government's interest in not paying
compensation to protect the flow of commerce, on the former watercourse is greater
than the same interest in the latter watercourse.
218. Valdez, 666 F.2d at 1238.
219. 550 F. Supp. 669 (Cl. Ct. 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 160 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 343 (1983).
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River which resembled a peninsula because of a loop in the river bed.
The government purchased land from Miller and diverted the river
across the peninsula.' The old bed then became farmable land to
which Miller obtained title.2 ' In 1969 the Corps built a multi-purpose
dam and raised the water level downstream from the Miller property
making the old channel property unfit for farming.2 2 When the parties stipulated that the land had been subject to the servitude prior
to the diversion, the issue became whether the servitude remained
attached to the land even though the land was no longer a river bed.
The Claims Court treated the servitude as a property interest and
ruled that the diversion was an avulsive change. 2 3 Citing traditional
property law, it ruled that the government's property interest did
not shift with the river as long as a navigational purpose existed in
the exposed land." ' The court found the requisite navigational purpose in the parties' stipulation: "It is necessary to flood the lands
in controversy to permit navigation on the Arkansas River." So the
court ruled that the servitude still applied to the old river bed and
thus denied compensation." 5
The Miller decision exemplifies the confusion with which the doctrine is applied. The court treated the servitude as though it were

220. The Corps of Engineers was concerned that the river would cut its own
channel across the "neck" of the peninsula. This natural change would have hindered
navigation because the new channel would have contained sharp bends and obstructions. The Corps bought Miller's land, dug a straight channel across the peninsula,
and diverted the river in 1952. Id. at 671.
221. The old bed became a nonnavigable lake and eight hundred acres of farmable land. The case report does not specify how Miller subsequently acquired title
to the 800 acres. Id. at 672.
222. Id. at 672. Miller alleged that the land was subject to increased and prolonged flooding. He also claimed that the downstream impoundment raised the water
table beneath his land which made it so soggy that he was unable to machine farm
part of it. These are the same type of injuries for which compensation was allowed
in United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). See supra note 133.
223. "Avulsion" is a quick, perceptible, violent change in the river channel and
is opposed to "accretion" which is an imperceptibly slow change in the channel. Federal
common law and most states' law provide that an owner's title to riparian land will
shift and change with the accretions, however no shift in title is caused by an avulsive
change. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), overruled on other grounds,
429 U.S. 363 (1977).
224. The Bonelli decision introduced to the federal common law the proposition that the navigation servitude may attach to exposed riverbed if the land is
necessary for navigational purposes. Bonelli was relied on by the Claims Court to dispose
of the Miller case. Miller v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 669, 673 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
225. Id.
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a property concept using title doctrines"6 to decide the case even
though the Supreme Court explained that the servitude is a power
concept, not a property concept.' Furthermore, the Miller court relied
on overruled authority for the novel proposition that so long as a
navigational purpose existed, the servitude would apply to a former
streambed under the avulsion doctrine."
Even assuming the navigation servitude is a property concept,
the court's analysis was strained. If the servitude is a property interest, it must have burdened the exposed riverbed during the entire
time the bed was exposed.' Since the court's determination that the
servitude remained with the property depended on whether a navigational purpose existed, it should have asked whether such a purpose
existed when the government transferred fee title to Miller. That question would have been answered in the negative, because the dry
streambed had no navigational purpose once the diversion was completed.2" Instead, the court inquired whether a navigational purpose
presently existed. 3 Since the, land was already flooded, Miller
necessarily answered in the affirmative; yet, that interrogatory was
irrelevant because if the servitude did not continuously burden the
streambed, title to the land was unencumbered.
If the servitude is a power concept, the court unnecessarily considered the accretion and avulsion doctrines. The only question under
a power analysis is whether the servitude should apply. This question is answered by employing either a mechanical application or a
226. Avulsion and accretion are title doctrines used to determine whether a
change in the riverbed alters the ownership of both the newly submerged and the
newly exposed land. The Bonelli decision itself is a title decision. Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 313.
227. Justice Douglas in Twin City said "[tihe interest of the United States in
the flow of a navigable stream originates in the Commerce Clause. That Clause speaks
in terms of power, not of property." United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S.
222, 224 (1956).
228. The Court overruled Bonelli in Oregon Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (state law should have been applied in the Bonelli case instead
of federal common law).
229. Since Miller hadn't granted a new easement or servitude, the earlier servitude must have burdened the land the entire time. See W. BURBY. REAL PROPERTY
72-75 (3d ed. 1965).
230. Presumably, the government would never have transferred the land if
the Corps had required it for a navigational purpose. Even if the Corps had anticipated
using the dry bed for a purpose relating to navigation, they could have reserved an
appropriate interest. It therefore appears that a navigational purpose did not exist
in the streambed between the time of the diversion and the subsequent reflooding.
Nor does it appear that such a purpose was forseen by the parties.
231. Miller v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 669, 674 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
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balancing analysis. Using a mechanical analysis, the only questions
are whether the river is navigable and whether the injury occurred
between the banks, below the high water level.232 The court's decision under a balancing analysis would be based on a consideration
of the policies underlying the no-compensation rule. In neither case
would the court need to rely on title doctrines and a "navigational
purpose" test enunciated in a case of marginal precedential value.
The Kaiser-Aetna analysis was again disregarded in Loving v.
Alexander,233 where the court expanded the scope of the navigation
servitude by applying it to aid a project which was unrelated to improving navigation. When the Corps of Engineers built the Gathright
Dam on the Jackson River in Virginia, it destroyed an eleven mile,
state-stocked, public access trout fishery. The Corps proposed to
relocate the trout fishery in a nineteen mile section downstream from
the dam. The owners riparian to the proposed site along the stream
sought injunctive relief or compensation for the "taking" of their rights
of exclusivity.2' The district court found that the river was navigable
based on historic use, but then ruled that the Corps of Engineers
lacked regulatory jurisdiction due to a 1976 amendment to the Rivers
and Harbors Act.23 5 The court cavalierly applied the navigation servitude on the ground that the river was subject to commerce clause
regulation because future use of the proposed fishery by out-of-state
fishermen would affect interstate commerce.2' It distinguished KaiserAetna on grounds that the Jackson River, unlike Kuapa Pond, was
historically navigable and used a notice theory to justify its decision."'
The government therefore required riparian owners to allow public
access to the river and streambed without being paid compensation,
even though the government was without jurisdiction to regulate that
access to the river.
232. See supra note 114.
233. 548 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982), affd, 745 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984).
234. Id. at 1081.
235. 33 U.S.C. S 591 enacted in 1976 provides:
The prohibitions and provisions for review and approval concerning
wharves and piers in waters of the United States as set forth in sections
403 [403 gives the Corps of Engineers regulatory jurisdiction over all
navigable waters of the United States] and 565 of this title shall not apply to any body of water located entirely within one state which is, or
could be, considered a navigable body of water of the United States solely on the basis of historical use in interstate commerce.
The district court found that the Jackson was located entirely within Virginia and
that the determination of navigability was based solely on historical use. Therefore,
the court concluded that the Corps of Engineers lacked jurisdiction. Loving v. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079, 1090 (W.D. Va. 1982).
236. Id. at 1090-91.
237. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,238 ruling that the
Jackson was legally navigable (though not presently navigable) since
it had been used to float logs several times in the early 1900's.' 5 Based
on the navigability ruling, the court then applied the servitude and
commented only that the servitude had existed since the ratification
of the Constitution. 40 In a dictum, the court cautioned that its decision only granted public access to the surface of the river not the
bed and banks.'
The Fourth Circuit opinion exemplifies the apparently absurd
results which can be reached when courts mechanically apply the doctrine based solely on a finding of navigability. Under Virginia law,
riparian owners hold fee title to the bed and banks of the stream. 42
Since the Alexander court granted public access only to the surface
of the river, the public may not fish standing on the banks or in the
stream itself. The only practical way that the public can use the river
is by boat, yet the river is not presently navigable. Therefore the
public may not be able to enjoy the fishery at all.
The Alexander opinions represent the greatest expansion of the
navigation servitude since Twin City and Grand River Dam Authority because the Alexander courts applied the servitude in a context
unrelated to maintaining navigation. Congress did not intend the
Gathright Dam to aid navigation;243 the Jackson River is not presently navigable;4 4 and the Corps did not even have jurisdiction to attempt to make it navigable.4 5 The navigation servitude was applied
solely to protect a proposed public recreation interest. Such a purpose is lofty, but it is not and never has been the intended purpose
of the doctrine.2 ' The procurement of public recreation facilities has
always involved the payment of just compensation." ' Alexander undoubtedly falls within Justice Rehnquist's admonition that under the
strict logic of the recent decisions, the no-compensation rule could

238. Loving v. Alexander, 745 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984).
239. Id. at 264-67.
240. Id. at 267.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 268.
243. "In 1946 Congress authorized construction of the Gathright Dam on the
Jackson River, Virginia, for purposes of flood control, water quality control, and recreation." Alexander, 548 F. Supp. at 1082.
244. Id. at 1085.
245. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
246. Harnsberger, supra note 3, at 145.
247. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1895) (upholding the power to
condemn land for recreational purposes as long as just compensation is paid); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
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theoretically be applied to any regulation under the commerce clause
no matter how unrelated to navigation. 48 By failing to apply any type
of balancing analysis in Alexander, the Fourth Circuit arguably confined the Kaiser analysis to similar fact situations. Moreover, Alexander represents an unwarranted expansion of the navigation
servitude.
The Fourth Circuit also abandoned the Kaiser balance and ruled
in Ballam v. United States that the servitude applies to all naturally
navigable waterways. 9 Ballam claimed a "taking" when the banks
of a man-made navigable canal created and maintained by the United
States eroded her property. The court first ruled that if the canal
were a natural waterway, the servitude would automatically apply. 21,
It then construed the deed granting an easement for the canal as intending the canal to be treated as though "it had always existed as
a product of natural forces".2 1 Lastly, the court applied the servitude
and denied compensation.
The decision disregarded the Kaiser
analysis and evidenced the Fourth Circuit's apparent intention to limit
Kaiser-Aetna to its facts.
Even though many courts automatically apply the servitude in
traditional river context cases, at least one court has declined to
mechanically deprive the owner of compensation and has looked to
the equities involved. The Corps of Engineers in 119.67 Acres v. United
States' instituted condemnation proceedings under congressional directive to acquire a "spoil servitude"' for improvement of the Mississippi
River in Louisiana. Eventually the government and the owner reached
an agreement which was entered as a consent judgment in 1974.5
In 1978, the Corps ignored the judgment alleging that it was void
because the navigation servitude exempted the Corps from paying
compensation."z Before reaching the servitude question, the court ruled
that the government had surrendered its right to assert the navigation servitude.257 The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the 1974 agree248. United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. 163, 177 (1979).
249. Ballam v. United States, 747 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984).
250. Id. at 918.
251. Id. at 919.
252. Id.
253. 663 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1981).
254. The land was condemned in order to guarantee locations for the placement of special materials dredged from the Mississippi River by the Corps of Engineers
in their continuing efforts to maintain the navigability of the river. Id. at 1329 n.1.
255. Id. at 1329.
256. Id. at 1330.
257. The decision is unique because only two other navigation servitude cases
have used government estoppel or similar principles. In United States v. Stoeco Homes,
Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), the court ruled that the government surrendered
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ment required eighteen months of negotiation and was authorized by
the Department of Justice and the Secretary of the Army." Congress
had authorized condemnation proceedings, and the private owner had
foregone a considerable compensation award. The court ruled that
after four years the government must keep its word, so it upheld
the 1974 consent judgment. 259 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
declined a mechanical application of the servitude which would have
been warranted under Chicago, M., St. P. 260 and applied an equitable
defense even though the courts are historically reluctant to estop the
government."' The 119.76 Acres decision consequently represents at
least one court's attempt to restrict the navigation servitude.
The post-Kaiser-Aetna cases involving R.H.A. and C.W.A. regulation have not expanded the navigation servitude.262 At least one decision declined to apply the mechanical, territorial analysis. Instead, the
Court of Claims inquired whether the doctrine was intended to be
used to deny the only feasible access to a particular island. That court
found that the doctrine was not so intended and denied compensation." 3
In the more traditional river cases, the courts are not applying
a balancing approach but are applying dogmatic precedent to decide
servitude questions.' In one instance, the results would probably have
its servitude over a marsh land when it allowed a developer to fill the marsh in without
reserving the servitude. These facts are strikingly similar to Miller v. United States,
550 F. Supp. 669 (Cl. Ct. 1982), however, completely different analyses in both cases
led to opposite results. See supra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
The Monongahela Navigation court earlier had relied on estoppel by ruling that
the United States implicitly invited Monongahela to build a dam which the government then took. The Court estopped the government from arguing the servitude and
awarded compensation for the lost toll franchise. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). Judicial reluctance to estop the government is undoubtedly the reason that only two prior cases have relied on the estoppel defense even though
it is raised in most every case. For an interesting analysis see Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1979).
258. 119.67 Acres, 663 F.2d at 1337-38.
259. Id.
260. The land in question was presumably below mean high water mark of
the navigable Mississippi River; therefore, under Chicago, M., St. P., the navigation
servitude would have applied to the case. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 257.
262. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
263. Laney v. United States, 661 F.2d 145 (Ct. Cl. 1981). See supra notes 195-200
and accompanying text.
264. See Ballam v. United States, 747 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984); Loving v. Alexander, 745 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984), affg, 548 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Va. 1982); United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Valdez, 666 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1982); Miller v.
United States, 550 F. Supp. 669 (Cl. Ct. 1982). See also supra notes 206-52 and accompanying text.
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been similar under either approach.!6 5 In another instance, the court
used a confused property analysis relying on questionable authority
to reach a decision that could only be justified under a power theory
of the navigation servitude."' In still another case, the court simply
followed the formula of prior precedent and denied compensation
without considering for what purposes the doctrine was being invoked."7
Finally, at least one court of appeals has shown that it intends to
employ the Kaiser analysis only in situations similar to the facts in
Kaiser-Aetna."'
The recent decisions exhibit inconsistent analyses. Some courts
inquire into the purposes for which the doctrine is being applied. Other
courts, especially in the river context, automatically apply the doctrine on a finding of navigability. These latter courts rest their decisions on a mechanical formula which according to one accomplished
jurist "is a slumber that, prolonged, means death." 9 The courts should
apply the rule only to further the purposes for which it was developed:
to promote and ease water travel.
PROPOSAL

The concept that the federal government holds an interest or
power over our nation's water courses, which is so dominant that the
government is not obligated to pay just compensation when private
property rights are taken or destroyed, is unique in American law." '
The United States is required to pay compensation when it appropriates private property under other constitutional powers which
are certainly not inferior to the power to regulate and control navigation.' Compensation is paid when property is taken to build airports,'
highways,7 3 pipelines,274 railroads75 and other projects which aid interstate commerce; yet, water travel is uniquely protected.

265. Valdez, 666 F.2d 1236. See supra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
266. Miller, 550 F. Supp. 669. See supra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
267. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079. See supra notes 233-48 and accompanying text.
268. Ballam, 747 F.2d 915. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
269. Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 3 (1915).
270. Morreale, supra note 24, at 16, 17.
271. Note, supra note 3, at 1523-24.
272. United States v. 1177 Acres in Florida, 51 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Fla. 1943)
(compensation for land for airport). See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946) (aircraft overflights established a compensable taking).
273. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930) (compensation paid for land for
highway).
274. Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Co. v. Linebery, 326 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959) (compensation for a pipeline easement).
275. Secombe v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co., 90 U.S. 108 (1874) (compensation
for a railroad right-of-way).
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A two-fold explanation for this unique doctrine lies in American
history. First, the English common law had developed the concept
of a servitude from its jus publicum concept that private rights in
the stream could not be asserted in derogation of the public right
to navigation."' This concept was imported to the thirteen colonies
and became a starting point for later decisions which developed the
American version of the navigation servitude." ' Second, throughout
the nineteenth century, water travel was a most important method
of transporting goods in interstate and foreign commerce. 8 As the
United States industrialized, it became increasingly necessary to
develop and maintain America's network of inland rivers so that they
might be utilized as highways for transportation. " 9 This sense of
necessity, combined with the limited nature of the federal government at the time, prompted the development of the navigation servitude because the compensation liabilities which the government
would incur without such a rule would cripple its ability to facilitate
transportation and promote commerce." Thus, the American navigation servitude was developed as a result of a common law "seed,"
and a strong government interest in promoting navigation without
incurring excessive liability. The purpose of the doctrine was only
to develop watercourses as public highways and nothing more.28'
Today the government's interest in water has expanded to include reclamation projects, flood control, recreation, and power generation.282 The servitude has also been expanded, though not to the limits
of the commerce clause.282 Other measures of transportation have
become more important to interstate and foreign commerce than
water-based transportation.28' Similarly, the federal government has
become much more powerful and stable since the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, the public interest in maintaining this judge-made excep276. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
277. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894). See Harnsberger, supra note 3,
at 108; Morreale, supra note 24, at 18-19.
278. F. TRELESE, supra note 84, at 711-12.
279. B. MORRELL, OUR NATIONS WATER RESOURCES-POLICIES AND POLITICS 37-38
(1972); D. PEGRUM, TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 57-59 (3d ed. 1973);
E. STARR, FROM TRAILDUST TO STARDUST 99 (1945).
280. The Court in Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 164-65 (1900), felt that
allowing compensation claims by riparians who had lost their access to the river would
cripple the government's efforts to improve navigation on navigable waters. See supra
note 111.
281. J. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 99, 101.
282. F. TRELEASE, supra note 84, at 711-12.
283. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
284. Inland waterways including the Great Lakes carried only 15% of the freight
traffic in the United States in 1952. S. DAGGETT, PRINCIPLES OF INLAND TRANSPORTATION 39 (4th ed. 1955).
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tion to the fifth amendment which applies only to navigation is not
as strong as it once was when the doctrine was first developed. Yet,
285
the scope of the servitude has been expanding since its inception.
The essence of the problem is that the courts must find a
workable and reasonable boundary between Congress' power to control navigation in the public interest and the rights of riparian land
owners to compensation for injuries caused by the exercise of that
power. The problem is one of harmonizing the public right to navigation with the private property rights guarantee of the fifth amendment. In order to harmonize the two, the public right must be asserted
as sparingly as possible and only when necessary."z The courts must
decide whether the public interest in controlling navigation is sufficient to outweigh the private property rights guaranteed by the fifth
amendment.
To determine the public interest in each proposed application
of the doctrine, the courts should initially examine whether the purpose of the doctrine is being served. The Supreme Court recently
defined this purpose as assuring that "such streams retain their capacity to serve as continuous highways for navigation in interstate com'
merce." 287
This definition is composed of a two-part analysis. First,
the body of water should be examined to determine whether it is,
or has potential to become, a continuous highway in interstate commerce. Using this analysis, the Mississippi River would have more
potential than the Valdez small boat harbor. Second, the proposed
project should be examined to determine whether it would increase
the capacity of the particular body of water to serve as a highway
for interstate commerce. For example, the removal of a pier in the
Ohio River aids navigability more than the removal of that same pier
on an island in the ocean.2 8
The private property interest in compensation will always be
substantial because of the fifth amendment guarantee; however, in
some instances it may be more compelling. Private investment and
reliance on governmental actions may add to the private interest.288
285. See supra notes 67, 68 and accompanying text.
286. Not only does the navigation servitude conflict with commonly recognized
property rights, but it conflicts with the express proscription of the fifth amendment.
Therefore, it should be used as sparingly as possible.
287. United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. 163, 178 (1979).
288. The amount of public interest in removing an obstruction to navigation
depends on where that obstruction is located, and to what degree that obstruction
hampers navigation.
289. Kaiser-Aetna's interest was compelling because of what Justice Rehnquist
called -"investment backed expectancies." Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180. See also supra
note 257 and accompanying text.
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An example is where an individual purchases land from the federal
government, which purported to convey a fee without reservation or
notice of the servitude.' In these situations, the private property interest will almost always outweigh the governmental interest.
When the court has completed its balance and decided to apply
the servitude to a particular claim, the prior precedent should then
be relied on to determine the territorial limits of the servitude. These
precedents should not be used to determine whether the servitude
applies, because the courts typically decided these cases without in1
quiring into the purposes for which the servitude was invoked. The
application of these precedents would undermine the entire balancing
process.
A balance must also be struck when Congress authorizes projects which "aid navigation." The courts would properly defer to Congress' decision to invoke the navigation regulatory power, but since
the navigation servitude is not automatically applied when Congress
exercises its navigation power, the courts must still decide whether
to apply the servitude. The congressional determination of purpose
as a factor which would increase the governshould then be considered
92
interest.
ment's
The balancing test will bring the public-private tension to the
forefront of the analysis every time application of the navigation servitude is proposed. Such a policy of ad hoc case determination would
admittedly generate some uncertainty, but generally the equities involved would lead to a narrowing rather than an expansion of the
servitude. With the acquisition of precedent, 3the uncertainty surrounding this unique doctrine would diminish.2
290. See Miller v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 669 (Ct. Cl. 1982). See also supra
notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 117-50 and accompanying text. As pointed out in the text
and notes, most of the prior cases mechanically applied the servitude if it fell within
the prescribed boundary limitations.
If the Court adopts the balancing of interests analysis suggested by this note,
the cases decided using only a boundary analysis should not be substituted for this
balancing of interest. They may be used to determine the territorial boundary of the
servitude once the Court finds it applicable.
292. The judiciary should not defer to the congressional declaration that a given
project is intended to aid navigation, such that the declaration would amount to an
unreviewable congressional decision to apply the servitude. It would seem anomalous
to allow Congress unreviewable authority to except the fifth amendment simply by
stating that the purpose of a project is, among others, to aid navigation.
293. As long as the purpose of the servitude is defined as assuring that streams
serve as continuous highways for transportation, cases in which the proposed project
has no relation to water transportation will not result in an application of the servitude and thus the present scope of the doctrine will be narrowed. See, e.g., United
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The navigation servitude is unique in our law as a judge-made
exception to the fifth amendment. One explanation for the development of this doctrine is that it was a necessary government subsidy.'
The necessity for this subsidy is no longer clear, therefore in order
to harmonize the public right to navigation with private property
rights, both competing interests should be balanced in every case
before the servitude is applied. 5
The government's interest should be measured by determining
how much the proposed action will improve the watercourse as a
highway for commerce. The private interest should be determined by
the fifth amendment. Prior precedent should only be used after the
servitude is found applicable, and then only to define its territorial
limits. Similarly, congressional determination to invoke the commerce
clause power over navigation should not be conclusive regarding application of the servitude, but merely persuasive of Congress' attempt
to balance the equities. 9 '
The goal of this balancing approach is to inject into the analysis
a tension between all the interests involved and to escape a mechanical
application of the doctrine based on ill-defined terms such as "dominant power," and "superior easement." As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said: "The eternal struggle in the law between constancy and change
is largely a struggle between history and reason, between past reason
and present needs." 7 When applying the navigation servitude, the
courts should now consider present needs.
CONCLUSION

The navigation servitude is a judge-made exception to the "taking" clause of the fifth amendment. Several theoretical foundations
have been advanced by the Court to justify this unique doctrine. None
of those foundations, however, can adequately justify the servitude
in its present state. The scope of the navigation servitude has been
greatly expanded through the Court's expansion of the navigability
definition and through the Court's mechanical use of a territorial
analysis. The decisions exhibit a lack of direction which is probably
due to the uncertain theoretical foundation.
States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United States v. Commodore
Park Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945); Loving v. Alexander, 745 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984). See
also supra notes 91-98, 112-16, 233-52 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
297. F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE CONSTITUTION 40 (1977).
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The 1979 Kaiser-Aetna decision can be viewed as an attempt to
limit the doctrine, but due to its unique fact situation and lack of
clarity, Kaiser-Aetna has only increased the confusion surrounding the
navigation servitude. The post-Kaiser courts have adopted the Kaiser
balancing analysis in the non-river servitude cases, but the Kaiser
approach has only been given minimal attention in the traditional river
situations. The fundamental theory behind the doctrine is still unclear;
some lower courts insist that the servitude is a power concept while
others apply a property law analysis. The confusion within this doctrine is exemplified by two decisions which recently applied the servitude to further recreational fishing interests in a presently nonnavigable stream.298
The navigation servitude should be seen as a government subsidy for the improvement of navigation, but the need for the subsidy
is no longer clear. In every case, the government interests in the continued subsidy should be balanced against the private property interests protected by the fifth amendment. The balancing approach will
insure that the scope of this unique doctrine is narrowed to include
only those projects which substantially improve navigation. It will also
help harmonize the public and private interests by focusing the
analysis on the conflict between the two interests. The decisions would
then turn on the resolution of this important tension instead of on
whether a proposed application fits within a territorial rule. The
navigation servitude could then become a living doctrine, sensitive
to present policies and interests instead of reflecting past considerations which are no longer applicable.
RANDOLPH

E.

RUFF

298. Loving v. Alexander, 745 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984), aff'g, 548 F. Supp. 1079
(W.D. Va. 1982).
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